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This paper, the second out of two about the Cuban biotech sector and vaccine industry, gives 
an  account  of  the  creation,  organization,  and  management  mechanisms  of  the  techno-
economic networks of the Cuban biotech sector and vaccine industry, by applying the concept 
of techno-economic evaluations developed by Michel Callon. It also seeks to explain the 
apparent paradox about shifting the emphasis of the biotech sector from that of targeting a 
‘modern’ disease pattern to that of a’ traditional’ one that was identified in the first paper. 
Centralized and participatory decision making processes seem to facilitate close coordination 
and  cooperation  between  the  different  research  and  development  centers.  The  paper  also 
inquires into the relation between the biotech sector and the national System for Science and 
Technological Innovation. 
Keywords: Innovation systems, techno-economic networks, Cuba, vaccines, biotechnology. 
Introduction 
The first paper about the Cuban vaccine industry (Plahte 2010) discussed how the interests of 
public health and commercialism were articulated in the biotech sector, and the issue was 
approached by looking at strategic evaluations undertaken in the process of developing the 
sector. In the present paper the main issue is how the Cuban biotech sector – of which the 
vaccine industry is an integral part – was established, and how it is organized and managed 
within its national political and administrative framework. The application of the techno-
economic network approach developed by Michel Callon (Callon 1991; Callon 1992; Callon, 
et al. 1992) as the conceptual framework for the analysis will cast light on several questions 
that arise in relation to that main issue.  
While strategic evaluations are related to the selection of desired products of a particular 
intervention,  techno-economic  evaluations  revolve  around  questions  of  which  actors  and 
organizations that have to be enrolled or created, and how to order them and whichever other 
heterogeneous resources that should become involved. This paper is an attempt at identifying 
or inferring some of the most important techno-economic evaluations that have been carried 
out in the Cuban biotech sector.   2 
An additional objective of this paper is to explain the apparent paradox that was identified in 
the first paper, namely that despite the fact that a main rationale for creating the biotech sector 
was  to  confront  the  morbidity  and  mortality  transition  towards  a  modern,  or  ‘Northern’, 
disease  pattern  dominated  by  cancer,  cardiovascular  and  congenital  conditions,  a  strong 
vaccine industry was created, whose products target mainly a traditional, ‘Southern’, disease 
pattern dominated by infectious diseases. 
The techno-economic network is thought of as consisting of three main sub-networks – the 
scientific (S), the technological (T), and the market (M) sub-networks – and the two interme-
diate border zone sub-networks between them: the S-T sub-network that transfers the results 
of the scientific sub-network (S) into the technological and productive (T) sub-network, and 
the T-M commercializing sub-network, which brings the products to the end-users and con-
sumers in the market (M) sub-network, see Figure 1 on page 7. The government may intervene 
in a techno-economic network by acting on any of these sub-networks. This paper analyses 
the Cuban biotech sector and vaccine industry in terms of these main conceptual elements. 
This analysis is structured around the following research questions. 
–  which elements of biomedical techno-economic networks existed in Cuba prior to the 
creation  of  the  biotech  sector,  and  what  kinds  of  actions  and  interventions  were 
decided upon in relation to the initial techno-economic evaluations? 
–  how did the techno-economic networks of the Cuban biotech sector emerge, and what 
is the ordering principle for the division of labor between the different biotech centers? 
–  how are the main techno-economic sub-networks S, T and M connected, and what are 
the consequences for the R&D activities in the S sub-network of that connection? 
–  why did a vaccine industry targeting ‘traditional’ infectious diseases evolve, when the 
main rationale for creating the biotech sector was to confront the emerging pattern of 
‘modern’ diseases related to cancer and cardiovascular and congenital disorders? 
–  to what extent do the Cuban biotech centers collaborate across organizational bounda-
ries? 
–  how  are  the  techno-economic  networks  of  the  Cuban  biotech  sector  managed  and 
coordinated? 
–  what are the relations between the techno-economic networks of the Cuban biotech 
sector and the general domestic scientific, technological and productive systems in 
Cuba? 
The accumulated responses to these questions will result in a comprehensive narrative about 
the Cuban biotech sector in general and the vaccine industry in particular. As stated in the first 
paper, the vaccine industry is an integral part of the biotech sector, to the extent that in Cuban 
and  international  literature  and  discourse  it  is  not  common  to  regard  the  vaccine  related 
activities  of  the  sector  as  an  industry  proper.  The  present  analysis  will  demonstrate  this 
integration. Nevertheless, it makes sense to analyze the vaccine related activities as a separate, 
but by no means isolated, phenomenon. 
This paper starts with a brief introduction to the concept of the techno-economic network, 
with an emphasis on techno-economic evaluations and the options for interventions that are 
available. Then follows an account of the status of Cuban biosciences at the time of the initial 
techno-economic evaluation in the late 1970s. The paper proceeds with a description of the 
main biotech centers, their specialization and the way the different sub-networks (S, T and M, 
as well as the intermediate sub-networks S-T, T-M, and M-S) are ordered and organized by 
application of the concept of the ‘complete cycle’. The next section is a detailed account of 
how the Finlay Institute was created in the process of combating the meningococcal epidemic 
in the 1980s, which in turn partly explains the apparent paradox related to the morbidity tran-
sition.   3 
The next section describes how one of the production lines of the vaccine industry centers is 
integrated. Then follows an analysis of the management model that has been applied in the 
Cuban biotech sector: a centralized decision making process, which is facilitating, and to 
some extent mitigated by, formal and informal horizontal collaborative mechanisms. The final 
section before the conclusion is about the (weak) relation between the Cuban biotech sector 
and the remaining part of the Cuban national innovation system. 
Techno-economic networks 
Before presenting the empirical material some additional concepts of Callon’s model should 
be introduced. A techno-economic network is incomplete whenever one or several of the sub-
networks (S, S-T, T, T-M, M [and M-S]) are almost absent or severely underdeveloped. If, on 
the other hand, the sub-networks are in place, the techno-economic network is chained.  
In a convergent network the links are strong and well developed to the extent that the various 
actors may mobilize resources from another sub-network at low costs in terms of efforts, 
translations and reordering. Conversely, in a dispersed network the links are weak in the sense 
that the translation of phenomena from one sub-network to another is cumbersome and prob-
lematic. For instance, in a convergent network a salesperson (T-M) may have a direct link 
with a scientist (S), while in a dispersed network even the interaction between designers (S-T) 
and production engineers (T) may be weak. 
The notion of short and long networks is similar to that of incomplete and chained networks. 
Long networks comprise the entire chain from S to M, while a short network may not include 
S, only T and M, for instance. The difference, then, between a short and an incomplete net-
work is that a short network would not be improved by adding the ‘missing’ sub-network, 
because the missing part is considered redundant for meeting the strategic goals in the first 
place. 
Based on these distinctions it is possible to identify two main types of interventions: break-
through action is to create new sub-networks in a discontinuous way, primarily whenever an 
incomplete network is present. Similarly, a dispersed network calls for continuity actions that 
aim at stimulating, extending or strengthening existing (weak) relations between the different 
sub-networks.  
According to Callon, interaction between the main actors is mediated by intermediaries, like 
artifacts (products, prototypes, models, cargo transporting vehicles and vessels), texts (journal 
papers, R&D proposals, tender announcements, contracts), hybrid objects like money and its 
derivatives, and skills incorporated in humans. Having now (re)introduced the conceptual 
framework, we may move to the empirical sections of this paper. 
The initial techno-economic evaluations 
This section seeks to answer the first of the six research questions of this paper, namely what 
was the status of the biomedical techno-economic networks in Cuba by the late 1970s, and 
how did the Castro government go about in creating the Cuban biotech sector. In other words, 
which main considerations were influential in the initial techno-economic evaluations that 
resulted in the main design of the biotech sector? 
The first paper touched briefly on a decisive event in the history of the Cuban public health 
system, namely the morbidity and mortality transition emerging in the late 1970s that subse-
quently became an important motivation for creating a domestic biotech sector. The following 
paragraphs assess the status of the Cuban biomedical scientific and technological capabilities   4 
at that time, and on that basis we will try to infer the core ideas of the techno-economic evalu-
ations that initiated the creation of the Cuban biotech sector. 
This section describes the historical preconditions to the Cuban biotech sector, of which early 
interventions in medical sciences on part of the revolutionary government are important. It 
also points at the creation of the Biological Front and the interferon pilot project as two 
important stepping stones for what was later to come. 
The history of Cuban biomedical science 
The dedication to science by the Castro government is not to say that Cuban science started 
from scratch in 1959. Cuba’s tradition of science and intellectual life dates back to the 18
th 
century – one of the first universities in the New World was founded in the city of Havana in 
1728 (García and Sáenz 1989). 
Cuban science boasts a few but quite spectacular accomplishments, in particular in medicine. 
In 1901 the Cuban scientist Carlos J. Finlay (1833-1915) in cooperation with Walter Reed of 
the USA established that the mechanism of transmission of yellow fever was by way of the 
mosquito species Culex (García and Sáenz 1989). In 1951 a foundation for cardiovascular 
disease research was founded by Agustín Castellanos, who was subsequently nominated for 
the Nobel Prize in medicine. The institute was however closed in 1960, when its founder left 
the island (Anon. 2004) along with almost half of the share of the Cuban population that had a 
higher education of some sorts. Achievements like these two selected examples seem to have 
been results of individual excellence rather than organizational strength, since the research 
organizations appear to have been small and poorly funded. 
With such a fragmented scientific infrastructure as a point of departure during the 1960s and 
early 1970s the revolutionary government established some 100 research centers at the uni-
versities, at the ministries, and at the Academy of Sciences (Fernández 1999). Of these there 
are some important research centers in medicine and related disciplines that would be of great 
importance in the later development of the biotechnology sector. 
In 1962 the Institute of Basic and Preclinical Medical Sciences ‘Victoria de Girón’
1 in Havana 
was created as a medical school and an organization for education of cohorts of medical pro-
fessors, who in turn were deployed as teachers as new medical schools were founded in other 
cities (Figueras and Pérez 1998). While ‘Victoria de Girón’ educated medical professors, the 
National Center for Scientific Research (CNIC),
2 established in 1965, served a similar pur-
pose in disciplines related to biomedicine, with research activities and training of scientists in 
physics,  chemistry,  biochemistry,  biophysics,  microbiology,  mathematics  and  computer 
science (Bravo 1998).
3   
The same year 10 centers dedicated to research into the most important medical disciplines 
were established. Some of these were based on former hospital departments. The mandates 
were threefold: research, tertiary medical service, and education in medical specialties (Anon. 
2004; Figueras and Pérez 1998).
4 By the late 1970s these centers, along with the university 
sector, constituted the main components of the Cuban S sub-network in biomedicine. 
                                                 
1 Instituto Superior de Ciencias Básicas y Preclínicas ‘Victoria de Girón’. 
2 CNIC: Centro Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas. 
3 Personal communication with Emilio García Capote, President of the Agency for Science and 
Technology, 3 July 2001. 
4 Personal communication with Emilio García Capote, President of the Agency for Science and 
Technology, 3 July 2001.   5 
The T sub-network was less developed, however. In 1959 the Cuban chemical pharmaceutical 
industry consisted of some 110 private nationally owned laboratories and about 10 branch 
plants  of  US  multinationals  (Lilly,  Pfizer,  Lederle,  etc.).  The  US  laboratories  were 
nationalized in 1960, and in 1966 they were transferred from three different ministries to 
become a state pharmaceutical industry under the Ministry of Public Health. During the 1970 
the activities were concentrated to a total of 14 laboratories, in which investments were made 
for  increased  productivity  and  expanded  product  range  with  the  main  aim  of  generics 
manufacturing  for  import  substitution  (Figueras  and  Pérez  1998;  Ratanawijitrasin  and 
Wondemagegnehu 2002).
5 In other words, the chemical pharmaceutical industry was a short 
techno-economic network, comprising T, T-M, and M, but not S, since any S sub-network 
seems not to have been regarded as a desired or missing element. However, this techno-
economic network had hardly any T capabilities in biopharmaceuticals. 
Thus, this industry was no firm foundation for a science based and innovative biotech sector. 
Cuban sources agree that the biomedical sector developed largely independently of the phar-
maceutical  industry  (Bravo  1998;  Figueras  and  Pérez  1998).  The  main  reason  is  that  the 
chemical technologies that are used in traditional pharmaceutical production constitute a very 
different knowledge domain from that of biotechnological technologies. The only direct link 
that has been identified is the fact that by the 1970s the Biological Products Company ‘Carlos 
J. Finlay’ (not to be confused with the Finlay Institute) produced tetanus, diphtheria, small-
pox, BCG, and rabies vaccines, as well as culture and diagnostics media. Nevertheless, a 
prominent example of this limited technological basis is the pharmacist and member of the 
Cuban Politburo Dr. Concepción Campa, who worked at the ‘Carlos J. Finlay’ factory prior to 
heading the group that invented the Cuban meningococcal vaccine.
6 More indirectly, it is 
possible that the pharmaceutical industry represented a pool of labor trained in pharmaceutical 
production. 
As stated in the first paper, by the late 1970s Cuba had developed a highly integrated system 
of public health, biomedical science and higher education. Simultaneously, it was becoming 
widely acknowledged that genetic engineering could be a promising technology for health 
interventions,  in  particular  for  addressing  the  diseases  of  developed  economies  that  were 
emerging as primary health problems on the island. 
The initial techno-economic evaluations 
However, the strategic question of how to proceed forward on this basis could not be resolved 
by the existing political and administrative bodies, so one of the first techno-economic evalu-
ations that were performed in relation to the biotech initiative resulted in Fidel Castro’s per-
sonal decision to create a high-profile interdisciplinary scientific consultative body in 1981, 
called The Biological Front,
7 headed by the president of the Academy of Sciences and former 
Director of CNIC. No such thing as a white paper or any other documents issued by the Bio-
logical Front is publicly available, but all sources agree that it had a profound impact in 
shaping the basic principles for the would-be Cuban biotech sector (Bravo 1998; Feinsilver 
1993; Reid-Henry 2008; Thorsteinsdóttir, et al. 2004).
8 That is, as part of a techno-economic 
evaluation it was decided to set up the Biological Front, which in turn participated in later 
                                                 
5 Personal communication with Celeste Sánchez, Senior Consultant at CECMED, 29 May 2001. 
6 Personal communication with Franklín Sotolongo, Finlay Institute, 4 September 2002; and with 
Celeste Sánchez, Senior Consultant at CECMED, 29 May 2001. 
7 The Biological Front: El Frente Biológico. 
8 Personal communication with Emilio García Capote, President of the Agency for Science and 
Technology, 3 July 2001.   6 
decision making, both in strategic and techno-economic evaluations. Since the mandate of the 
Biological Front was to advice on how existing national resources in the S sub-network could 
be used in creating the T sub-network, it makes sense to think of the creation of the Front as a 
breakthrough action intended at constructing an S-T sub-network. 
In terms of techno-economic networks then, what was present in Cuba by the late 1970s? Let 
us start by sketching out the techno-economic network of the public health system. The public 
health system may be thought of as a chained and convergent techno-economic network, 
since all the elements were present, and there were well developed links between them. The 
ten research centers in the most important medical disciplines represented the science (S) sub-
network, but also the S-T sub-network since they comprised tertiary medical services. The 
primary and secondary health institutions produced health services, that is, the T sub-network. 
The universal and free access to the health services constituted the T-M sub-network linking 
the public health system (T) to the entire Cuban population (M). 
If we now change the perspective from that of medicine and the public health system to that 
of medical biotechnology, the situation in the late 1970s was somewhat different. As in medi-
cine the science (S) sub-network existed in the capacity of the same ten centers, as well as the 
multi-disciplinary CNIC, and again the Cuban population represented a potential market (M), 
but with the public health system now representing part of an as yet underdeveloped T-M sub-
network. Note that in this sense one and the same actor-network – the public health system – 
fulfills the T functions in one techno-economic network, and the T-M functions in another.  
In other words, the S and M sub-networks existed, and part of the T-M sub-network was also 
present, so by the late 1970s the Cuban biomedical techno-economic network was incomplete, 
with the T sub-network almost entirely non-existent. The situation that faced the Castro gov-
ernment at that time was that almost the entire productive capability would have to be created 
from scratch in order to create a chained techno-economic network. President Castro, sup-
ported by the Biological Front, decided to start with a small pilot project. 
The interferon pilot project 
In early 1981 Kari Cantell of the at the Finnish Serum Institute in Helsinki was surprised by a 
request made to him by the Cuban embassy in Finland, asking whether his Interferon Labor-
atory would kindly receive a delegation of Cuban scientists for training in production and 
purification of human leukocyte interferon. At that time interferon was hailed as a potential 
‘magic bullet’ against both cancers and viral diseases, and Cantell’s lab had earned a reputa-
tion as a world leader on interferon research. After a few moments of initial doubt Cantell 
conceded, and six Cuban scientists stayed at the lab for a few weeks. Back in Havana the 
group produced interferon in its own laboratory just a few months later (Cantell 1998), and 
two years later the group performed recombinant interferon production in clinical trial quality 
and  quantities.  Subsequently,  the  interferon  pilot  project  was  converted  into  a  permanent 
research center, the Centre for Biological Research (CIB),
9 which still exists.  
The success of the interferon pioneers was taken as a proof that the Cuban S sub-network was 
in possession of the required capabilities for appropriating advanced bioengineering tech-
niques and executing targeted product developing projects. As a result of techno-economic 
evaluations in 1982-3 the major breakthrough action was decided upon. An entire and com-
prehensive biotechnological T sub-network was to be established, almost from scratch.  
 
                                                 



























Figure 1. The Cuban vaccine industry as a techno-economic network. Adapted from Callon et al. (1992). 
 
In 1986 President Castro proudly announced the inauguration of the flagship organization of 
Cuban biotechnology, the Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (CIGB),
10 with 
a main focus on recombinant technologies in medical, industrial and agricultural biotechnol-
ogy. Several other centers – among them Finlay Institute
11 and the Centre for Immunoassays 
(CIE)
12  –  were  also  under  construction  or  being  planned  for.  A  national  chained  and 
convergent techno-economic network in biotechnology was emerging.  
                                                 
10 CIGB: Centro de Ingeniería Genética y Biotecnología. 
11 ’Instituto Finlay’ 
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Non-human intermediaries   8 
The emerging techno-economic networks of the Cuban biotech sector 
This section turns to the second of the main research questions of this paper, namely how the 
techno-economic networks of the Cuban biotech sector emerged, and what is the ordering 
principle for the division of labor between the different biotech centers. The section starts 
with an overview of the biotech centers that may be said to constitute the Cuban vaccine 
industry, framed by the techno-economic network concept. The division of labor and func-
tions between the centers is described, and it will be demonstrated that the division of labor 
between the main centers is based on technology platforms, and that a few auxiliary centers 
are functionally specialized. 
The Cuban vaccine industry as techno-economic networks 
Figure 1 depicts the Cuban vaccine industry as a set of techno-economic networks, adapted to 
Callon’s original model. In the capacity of their technological specialization, each of the cen-
ters could be said to constitute a techno-economic network in its own right, since most of 
them operate according to the concept of ‘complete cycle’. The ‘complete cycle’ implies that 
each center is responsible for the entire value chain, from research through development, 
manufacturing, marketing and sales. In other words, for each of the technology platforms the 
S, T and S-T sub-networks are placed under the same roof and management. There is one 
dedicated T-M sub-network for each centre. The reason for them being separate legal and 
organizational entities will be explained below. 
The main vaccine industry centers 
Let us now turn to the most important research and production centers in the Cuban biotech 
sector. It is fair to say that four organizations also make up the core of the Cuban vaccine 
industry:  
–  Center for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (CIGB) 
–  the Finlay Institute 
–  Center for Molecular Immunology (CIM)
13 
–  Center for Biomolecular Chemistry (CQB)
14 
The CIGB, inaugurated in 1986, is the flagship of the Cuban biotech sector, being as it is by 
far the biggest organizations. Its main focus is on recombinant technologies based on single 
cell organisms, and the main products are vaccines as well as in other medical, industrial and 
agricultural biotechnology products. The main income of the CIGB is derived from sales of 
their recombinant hepatitis B vaccine and recombinant streptokinase.  
The CIM – inaugurated in 1994 – has its main focus on cancer, and its primary technology 
platform is recombinant mammalian cell cultures, that is, production of biological substances 
by  inserting  genes  coding  for  that  substance  into  a  cell  line  taken  from  mammals.  For 
instance, their erythropoietin
15 is produced in the Chinese Hamster Ovarian Cells (CHOC) 
expression system.
16 The product portfolio of CIM is dominated by therapeutic cancer vac-
cines and monoclonal antibodies. 
The product portfolio of the Finlay Institute is dominated by vaccines based mainly on ‘tradi-
tional’ bacterial fermentation technologies. The institute has several processing lines for bac-
                                                 
13 CIM: Centro de Inmunología Molecular. 
14 CQB: Centro de Química Biomolecular. 
15 The hormone erythropoietin stimulates the production of red blood cells. 
16 Personal communication with Rolando Pérez, Director of R&D at CIM, 5 May 2009.   9 
terial vaccines, and heads the National Program for Science and Technology in Human and 
Veterinary Vaccines. The Finlay Institute is almost entirely dedicated to vaccine products. 
The last of the core centers to be mentioned is also the latest to be created. It was founded in 
2008 by fusing the Center for Pharmaceutical Chemistry with the Center for Synthetic Anti-
gens at the University of Havana into the new entity Center for Biomolecular Chemistry 
(CQB). The Center for Synthetic Antigens developed a method for industrial production of 
synthetic haemophilus B (HiB) polysaccharide to be used as the active ingredient (antigen) in 
the HiB vaccine, which protects against meningitis and sepsis. CQB specializes in develop-
ment of methods for producing biological molecules (like antigens for vaccines) by way of 
chemical synthesis.  
The reason for omitting the CQB in the figure is that it is so recently established that there 
was not sufficient data available to locate it accurately in the scheme. The perforated bounda-
ries of the three other core centers illustrate the close horizontal collaboration that is facili-
tated by the Scientific Pole, whose functions will be explained in more detail below. Since the 
three auxiliary centers near the bottom of the drawing are also part of the Scientific Pole, 
applying dotted lines on their boundaries would have been easily justifiable. However, it was 
preferred to underscore their status as functionally specialized organizations by placing them 
apart from the rest, and rather connect them by the arrows indicating the main flow of non-
human intermediaries between them. The State Council has established itself as an obligatory 
passage point in the actor-network of the Cuban biotech sector by siphoning off and control-
ling the export revenues generated by the commercializing branches of each of the centers. 
Most of these biotech centers were created around research groups in existing laboratories and 
research centers. One group at the ‘Victoria Girón’ Institute working on hepatitis B immunol-
ogy was subsequently transferred to the CIGB to develop the hepatitis B vaccine (Bravo 
1998; Pentón, et al. 1994). A group of researchers at CNIC originally working on detection of 
alpha-fetoproteins for prenatal diagnosis neural tube malformations became the germ seed for 
the  CIE,  which  later  on  developed  the  mass  screening  equipment  MicroSUMA  (Bravo 
1998).
17 As will be spelt out in more detail below, the National Reference Laboratory for 
Meningococci at the Institute for Hygiene, Epidemiology and Microbiology, making the first 
steps in developing a Cuban meningococcal vaccine, later evolved into the Finlay Institute 
(Valcarcel, et al. 1991). Finally, somewhat later a group at the National Center for Oncology 
and  Radiobiology  (INOR)
18  –  one  of  the  ten  medical  research  centers  created  during  the 
1960s that were mentioned above – working on monoclonal antibodies was ‘spun off’ to 
found the Centre for Molecular Immunology (CIM), which was inaugurated in 1994 (Bravo 
1998). 
Auxiliary centers 
In addition, there are three entities that serve important auxiliary purposes: 
–  National Center for Bioproduction (BioCEN)
19 
–  the tropical medicine institute ‘Pedro Kourí’ (IPK)
20 
–  National Center for Production of Laboratory Animals (CENPALAB)
21 
                                                 
17 Personal communication with Roberto Guilarte, Sales Manager at TecnoSuma International S.A., 23 
May 2001. 
18 INOR: Instituto de Oncología y Radiobiología. 
19 BioCEN: Centro Nacional de Biopreparados. 
20 IPK: Instituto de Medicina Tropical ’Pedro Kourí’. 
21 CENPALAB: Centro Nacional para la Producción de Animales de Laboratorio.   10 
Contrary to the ‘complete cycle’ centers, BioCEN is a pure production facility without any in-
house R&D activities aimed at therapeutic, preventive or diagnostic product development to 
speak of. In addition to several complete bioproduction lines BioCEN has facilities for finali-
zation of vaccine products, i.e. formulation, filling and lyophilization, that are produced at the 
other centers. Moreover, the center has a product portfolio of culture media and other inter-
mediary biological products (BioCEN 2006). In other words, BioCEN is a specialized T func-
tions center. 
The tropical medicine institute ‘Pedro Kourí’ (IPK) is the hub of the epidemiological surveil-
lance systems in Cuba. It also houses hospital facilities, which are used in early clinical trials 
of vaccines, and it has a dengue fever vaccine development project underway. The immediate 
rationale for creating a dedicated tropical medicine organization was increasing contact with 
African countries – both military and civilian – throughout the 1980s.
22 
The IPK may be said to constitute an M-S sub-network, a category not included in Callon’s 
original model. As a ‘center of calculation’ for the Cuban epidemiological surveillance sys-
tems, it translates knowledge generated by the public health system about the national market 
M – i.e. the Cuban population – into scientific information about the incidence, prevalence 
and disease burden of different illnesses, as well as the impacts of the products – effectiveness 
data and adverse events – that are distributed. This scientific information is then fed into the 
science sub-network S. Note that this additional knowledge flow is not channeled through the 
T-M and S-T sub-networks that are in operation, but by way of a separate sub-network.  
Note that in vaccines also the T, T-M and M sub-networks use the information generated by 
the M-S sub-network. The T sub-network uses information about strain specific incidence 
rates in deciding culture strains for antigen production, the T-M sub-network uses disease 
burden data in its marketing activities, and similarly, the procuring organizations in the M 
sub-network also use disease burden data in calculating vaccine needs prior to issuing their 
purchase tenders. IPK also houses some S and T activities like the dengue fever vaccine 
development project, and the clinical trials services that are provided to the other centers 
could be said to be a T-M function.  
Lastly, the CENPALAB, which was created as early as in the mid 1980s, produces a diverse 
range of laboratory animals to the biotech centers, to the extent that Cuba is practically self-
sufficient on this product line. The auxiliary centers do have some in-house R&D activities, 
but these are mainly aiming at perfecting and improving on their production methods.
23 Like 
BioCEN, CENPALAB is specialized in T functions, but while BioCEN does end-of-pipeline 
processing, CENPALAB provides input to both the S and the T sub-networks. 
We may now respond to the second main research question of the paper. In techno-economic 
evaluations in the early 1980s the Cuban government decided to found a number of different 
biotech centers. While the main biotech centers have specialized according to their technology 
platform, the auxiliary centers are specialized according to function.  
We may now move to the third main question of this paper, namely that of how the S, T and 
M sub-networks connect to each other in the Cuban biotech sector. The following section 
presents the fundamental principle for securing the convergence of the techno-economic net-
works in the biotech sector – ‘the complete cycle’ – and it is becoming evident that each of 
                                                 
22 Personal communication with Emilio García Capote, President, the Agency for Science and 
Technology, 3 July 2001. 
23 Personal communication with Emilio García Capote, President, the Agency for Science and 
Technology, 3 July 2001.   11 
the main biotech centers constitute separate techno-economic networks covering the entire 
chain from S through to T-M on their respective assigned technology platforms.  
The concept of the complete cycle 
A fundamental principle for the organization and division of labor in the Cuban biotech sector 
is the concept of ‘complete cycle’ innovation, which means that each center is responsible for 
the entire innovation process, from ‘directed basic science’, applied science, development, 
industrial scale-up, IP management, clinical testing, registration, marketing and sales (Lage 
2006). The complete cycle not only connects T and M, but also serves to create the S-T sub-
network securing the reciprocal transfer of knowledge and other intermediaries between the 
scientific (S) and technological (T) sub-networks.  
Connecting S and T by the complete cycle 
What kinds of knowledge producing activities take place when the scientific sub-networks are 
divided according to technology platforms, and placed under the management of a highly 
market-oriented organization? Or in other words, what happens to the S sub-network when it 
is connected to the T sub-network by organizational and physical co-location? 
As  early  as  in  1993  Feinsilver  (1993),  referencing  international  biotechnology  experts, 
expressed concerns that applied science was prioritized at the cost of basic science, which 
could jeopardize the performance of Cuban biotech in the long term. De la Fuente (2001) fol-
lowed  up  by  criticizing  what  he  sees  as  a  priority  for  short  term  profit  making  products 
instead of long term technology development, following the crisis in the 1990s. 
Bravo’s (1998) compilation of interviews with prominent Cuban bioscientists also discusses 
this issue, and although different opinions on the matter were expressed, several of the inter-
viewees agreed that publishing was a low priority and that most research was carried out with 
a concrete medical application in mind. It is also my impression that in Cuba it is difficult to 
get funding for a research project that has scientific publication as its sole objective. 
Thorsteinsdóttir et al. (2006) conducted a comparative scientometric study of the performance 
of seven emerging or developing countries in the field of health biotechnology from 1991 to 
2002, among them Cuba. Cuba is number 40 in the world when ranking countries according 
to number of papers in absolute terms, but the figures are so disparate that the graph featured 
is on a logarithmic scale: while the USA – unsurprisingly topping the list – had 59,865 papers 
that time period, Cuba had 216, which places her close to the world average of number of 
papers per capita. CIGB, Finlay Institute and CIM accounted for 97 percent of the Cuban 
papers (Thorsteinsdóttir, et al. 2005), which may be indicative of the extent to which the S 
activities  in  Cuban  biotech  are  concentrated  to  these  centers,  possibly  at  the  cost  of  the 
university  sector.  One  of  the  conclusions  of  Thorsteinsdóttir  et  al.  (2006)  is  that  further 
research should discuss whether developing countries ought to structure their public sector 
health biotechnology research around universities or research institutes. At any rate, it is a fact 
that  the  Cuban  biotechnology  S  sub-network  is  capable  of  producing  internationally 
publishable science. 
Let us turn to the question of which scientific strategies that are pursued under such condi-
tions. In Reid-Henry’s (2008) opinion  
[…] the key element in Cuba’s ‘experimental milieu’ [is] the development of basic research 
within an applied research framework. (Reid-Henry 2008), p 5 
Rolando  Pérez  at  CIM  expanded  on  the  concept  of  ‘translational  research’  (Reid-Henry 
2008): the first phase of the innovation process would be ’science driven, but patent oriented’,   12 
characterized by exploratory, knowledge generating activities. Part of these efforts would be 
granting resources for so-called ‘Question of the year’-research projects, which are proposals 
submitted by individual scientists to put a designated amount of work into preliminary but 
risky research into a specific topic. One step further down the pipeline full blown research 
projects would have a timeline of 3-4 years, with the aim of generating a ‘proof of principle’ 
and a patent application.
24 
I also had the joy of listening to Vicente Vérez at CQB ridiculing what he saw as the ‘myth of 
pure basic science’. In his not much controversial opinion virtually all research activities – 
wherever in the world – would be funded with some sort of practical or commercial applica-
tion in mind. Apart from that, he advised against developing countries putting too much of 
their scarce resources into science without practical objectives. He envisaged instead ‘basic 
directed science’ with concrete medium term medical objectives,
25 a concept very similar to 
Pérez’ notion ‘translational research’. 
The centers seem to be at liberty to organize their research activities according to their own 
preferences. My interview with Gustavo Sierra at the Finlay Institute left the impression that 
their R&D project portfolio was more influenced by requests and assignments made by the 
State Council than what was the case with CIM for instance.
26 This might be explained by the 
fact that while the technology platform of the Finlay Institute is based on traditional bacteria 
culture  techniques,  CIM’s  therapeutic  cancer  vaccines,  based  on  proprietary  antigens  and 
adjuvants,
27 are cutting-edge science. 
In relative terms the Cuban S-T sub-networks display a superior performance in Quach et al.’s 
(2006)  comparative  analysis  of  biotechnology  patenting  in  seven  selected  developing  or 
emerging economies,
28 with a ratio of health biotechnology papers to health biotechnology 
patents of 9:1. South Korea’s 12:1 was second, while Brazil and Egypt were forming the base 
with 70:1 and 80:1 respectively. In other words, in Cuba a comparatively high proportion of 
the scientific results is translated into patentable technology.  
We may conclude that the Cuban biotech sector is capable of producing scientific information 
of  international  standards,  and  that  its  co-location  of  the  S  and  T  sub-networks  does  not 
represent  any  direct  obstacle  to  scientific  knowledge  production.  Rather  the  contrary:  al-
though the scientific knowledge production is guided by demands for practical application, 
the Cubans are willing and able to conduct research into basic scientific matters whenever 
circumstances so demand. The relatively low paper to patent ratio suggests that there is strong 
convergence between the S and T sub-networks. 
It seems like the Cuban biotech sector is organized more like a commercial pharmaceutical 
conglomerate than as a traditional public sector institute. For instance, in Brazil it is the Min-
istry of Science and Technology that has had the responsibility for promoting health biotech-
nology,  and  the  links  with  the  industrial  sector  have  been  somewhat  poorly  developed 
                                                 
24 Personal communication with Rolando Pérez, Director of R&D at CIM, 5 May 2009. 
25 Personal communication with Vicente Vérez, Director of CQB, 4 February 2009. 
26 Personal communication with Gustavo Sierra, Vice President, Finlay Institute, 3 February 2009. 
27 The antigen is the substance that is intended to induce a specific immune response, i.e. a response 
directed at the specific microbe that the vaccine is suppose to protect against. The adjuvant is the 
component of the vaccine that produces a general immune stimulation, without which the specific 
stimulation of the antigen would not be sufficiently strong to elicit protection against the (specific) 
microbe – or in this case the malign cells – in question. 
28 Quach et al. (Quach, et al. 2006) is a result of the same research project as Thorsteinsdóttir (2006; 
2005). The group comparatively studied the biotechnology sectors of Brazil, China, Cuba, Egypt, 
India, South Africa, and South Korea.   13 
(Thorsteinsdóttir, et al. 2005). In contrast, the Cuban biotech sector could be seen as an exam-
ple of applying private sector organizational principles in a publicly operated industry. 
Connecting T and M with the complete cycle 
In Figure 1 on page 7 the commercializing arms of each biotech center appear as separate boxes 
below the T-M double arrow. Heber Biotec is the commercializing division of CIGB, Finlay 
Vaccine  markets  the  vaccine  products  of  the  Finlay  Institute,  and  CIMAB  takes  CIM’s 
products to the markets. In other words, the T-M sub-network connecting the development 
and production sub-network T to the market sub-network M in the Cuban biotech sector was 
established by creating one marketing division for each techno-economic network.  
There are some exceptions, though. CQB’s HiB vaccine is marketed by CIGB’s Heber Biotec, 
and the ‘Pedro Kourí’ tropical medicine institute heads a dengue fever vaccine project without 
having manufacturing or marketing capabilities in-house, so the complete cycle concept is not 
dogmatically applied to all centers. 
At any rate, such anomalies do not explain why the T-M sub-networks have been legally 
separated. In practice the managing directors of the main centers seem to be responsible for 
the activities of the respective commercializing companies, so there seems to be a high degree 
of convergence across this organizational boundary. The reason for the separation is in fact 
drawn into the figure: the cash flow is diverted out of each techno-economic network and 
transferred to the State Council.  
However, before spelling out the full rationale for this way of ordering the techno-economic 
networks this paper presents a more detailed account of the process of developing the menin-
gococcal group B and C vaccine and of creating the Finlay Institute. In this way a more pro-
found understanding of the techno-economic evaluations that underlay the creation of the 
biotech sector is provided, and we also respond to the fourth main question of the paper by 
explaining the apparent paradox that was identified in the first paper: Why was it decided to 
create a vaccine industry targeting ‘traditional’ infectious diseases, given the fact that the 
main initial strategic evaluation resulted in a decision to confront the emerging patterns of 
‘modern’ diseases like cancer, and cardiovascular and congenital conditions?  
The history of the meningococcal vaccine and the Finlay Institute 
This case study illustrates the point made in the other paper that strategic and techno-econ-
omic evaluations do not proceed in a linear fashion in which the latter succeeds the former. 
Quite on the contrary, although in this case a techno-economic sub-network based on bacteria 
fermentation vaccine production technologies – the Finlay Institute – evolved as a result of 
the strategic decision of developing a meningococcal vaccine, that very sub-network con-
stituted an irreversibility that influenced later strategic evaluations in the direction of expan-
ding the vaccine innovation capabilities of the biotech sector. 
Meningococcal meningitis and septicemia are frightening diseases. Apparently healthy child-
ren and adolescents may succumb in a matter of days. Meningitis manifests itself when the 
meningococcal bacteria invade the membranes of the brain, and neurological sequelae like 
deafness and mental retardation are common in survivors. Septicemia, or blood poisoning, 
occurs when the bacteria invade the blood stream, obstructing circulation with the potential of 
causing multiple organ failures. Survivors risk amputations and disfiguration due to disrupted 
blood supply to limbs and skin tissues (Cartwright 1995; Dull and Rosenstein 2001). 
The Cuban health authorities reported slightly increasing incidence rates of meningococcal 
disease in 1976. In 1978 it was clear that a national meningococcal epidemic was developing,   14 
and the Ministry of Public Health founded a National Reference Laboratory for Meningococci 
at the National Institute for Hygiene, Epidemiology and Microbiology, with three employees 
(Valcarcel, et al. 1991).  
In 1979 the Cuban health authorities purchased 3.2 million doses of a bivalent meningococcal 
group A and C vaccine from Institute Mérieux of France, which were distributed at a cover-
age rate of 78 percent of the total population up to 19 years of age. At that time 34 percent of 
the cases were of group B of the Neisseria meningitidis, and 50 percent were of group C. As a 
result of the campaign, the incidence rate of group C infection plummeted, but only to be 
replaced by a corresponding increase in group B infection. And the total incidence rate con-
tinued to rise.  
The problem was that no vaccine against group B meningococci was available. The capsular 
polysaccharides of group A, C, W-135, and Y meningococci are immunogenic and safe vac-
cine antigens, but the group B polysaccharide is poorly immunogenic, and to make things 
worse, in 1983 it also appeared some evidence of a theoretical risk that using it as an antigen 
could cause autoimmune reactions against human brain tissue (Finne, et al. 1983). In other 
words, some experimental vaccines based on alternative antigens would have to be explored. 
This strategy entailed using the National Reference Laboratory as part of a T-M sub-network, 
in an effort at connecting to existing overseas T sub-networks (in turn backward connected to 
their respective national S and S-T sub-networks) to create a convergent international techno-
economic network for a meningococcal group B vaccine. 
The Cubans first contacted the Metchnikov Research Institute in Moscow in the Soviet Union, 
which worked on a trivalent group A, B and C meningococcal vaccine. In 1981 that vaccine 
was tested in Cuba on some 48 000 children between 6 months and 15 years of age, but it 
turned out tragically that both morbidity and mortality were higher in the vaccine group than 
in the unvaccinated control group (Valcarcel, et al. 1991).
29  
Then the Canadian Institute ‘Armand Frappier’ was contacted with the aim of testing their 
trivalent group A, B and Y vaccine in Cuba. However, the Phase I trial involving 11 children 
demonstrated only short lasting protection. The reason was that as it turned out the group B 
component of the Frappier vaccine was a different serotype from the group B strain causing 
the Cuban epidemic, and did not elicit protection against that strain (Valcarcel, et al. 1991).  
The strategy of building on existing prototype vaccines was abandoned, or perhaps put better, 
was becoming depleted of viable options. As a result of a strategic evaluation in 1983 it was 
decided to start developing a vaccine in Cuba. In other words, instead of connecting to over-
seas T sub-networks, a techno-economic evaluation resulted in a decision to create a T sub-
network in Cuba, based in part on the scientific capabilities (S) that had accumulated at the 
National Reference Laboratory. 
The  National  Reference  Laboratory  for  Meningococci  was  relocated  from  its  downtown 
Havana location at the Institute for Hygiene, Epidemiology and Microbiology, and its new 
premises were completed in March 1984, on the same site where the Finlay Institute is located 
today, in a western suburb of Havana. While the formal affiliation of the laboratory was with 
the BioCEN, after the relocation the State Council and Fidel Castro became its real sponsors. 
A  research  group  consisting  of  15  persons  was  created,  under  the  leadership  of  Dr. 
Concepción  Campa,  the  pharmacist  who  had  been  working  at  the  Biological  Products 
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targeting 80 percent of children over 5 years of age in 7 provinces, the effect of which is not 
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Company  ‘Carlos  J.  Finlay’  (not  to  be  confused  with  the  Finlay  Institute)  of  the 
pharmaceutical industry.
30  
Combating the epidemic had received high priority from the Ministry of Public Health all the 
way, but now the direct sponsorship shifted upwards to the top national political level. The 
research  group  could  now  count  on  extensive  support  from  and  cooperation  with  other 
research and production centers, like the Institute for Tropical Medicine ‘Pedro Kourí’ (IPK), 
whose epidemiological surveillance system improved significantly through the experiences 
made during the epidemic, the National Center for Scientific Research (CNIC), the Center for 
Biological Research (CIB), the Biological and Pharmaceutical Laboratory (LABIOFAM), the 
Center for Laboratory Animals (CENPALAB), all of which would later become parts of the 
Polo Científico. In addition, the group still collaborated closely with the Vice ministry of 
Hygiene and Epidemiology and the National Institute.
31  
The  group  had  direct  and  regular  contact  with  Fidel  Castro,  who  personally  sanctioned 
requests for investment in equipment and materials, and several sources testify that he even 
personally inspected that their food and lodging conditions were satisfactory (Bravo 1998; 
Valdés, et al. 1999). In other words, a convergent – but still incomplete – domestic techno-
economic network comprising the sub-networks from S through to T was in operation. 
The next major step was to contact Dr. Carl Frasch at the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) in the USA. His laboratory at the Biologics Division at the National Institutes of 
Health  (NIH)  campus  outside  Washington  DC  had  developed  a  meningococcal  group  B 
vaccine based on outer membrane protein complexes instead of capsular polysaccharide, and 
a Phase III trial in South Africa (Frasch, et al. 1983) had been prematurely terminated because 
his South African partners had run out of money. Hence, he was eager to test his principle in 
Cuba, and by traveling as a consultant for the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) he 
was  able  to  evade  the  US  embargo  legislation.
32  The  objective  was  to  develop  a 
meningococcal group B outer membrane protein vaccine based on Dr. Frasch’s production 
method, but using the Cuban bacterial strain instead of the South African strain used in his 
original prototype. 
Over  the  next  few  years  Frasch  visited  Cuba  four  or  five  times,  with  travel  grants  from 
PAHO. He taught the Cubans the principles for producing a vaccine based on protein com-
plexes of the outer membrane of meningococci. Also Dr. Claire Broome of the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), whose first visit to Cuba was in 1979, assisted in 
designing the clinical trials. After preclinical testing and a number of Phase I and II trials, the 
Cuban vaccine was tested in a Phase III double blind trial starting in early 1987 that involved 
about 106,000 volunteering children and adolescents. The protective efficacy rate was esti-
mated at 83 percent, which proved that the vaccine would be feasible for implementation in 
immunization campaigns and programs.  
Such activities started in 1990, and the entire population in the age group 0 – 20 on the island 
was immunized by April 1991. Incidence rates, which were already on the decline when the 
campaign was initiated, quickly returned to their low pre-epidemic endemic level (Frasch 
1983; Sierra, et al. 1991; Valcarcel, et al. 1991).
33 Eventually, by mobilizing and enrolling the 
                                                 
30 Personal communication with Franklín Sotolongo, Finlay Institute, 4 September 2002. 
31 Personal communication with Franklín Sotolongo, Noel González and Arturo Talavera, Finlay 
Institute, 28 June 2001. 
32 Personal communication with Carl Frasch, Chief, Laboratory for Bacterial Polysaccharides, Center 
for Biologics Evaluation and Research, Food and Drug Administration, 5 February 2002. 
33 Personal communication with Carl Frasch, Chief, Laboratory for Bacterial Polysaccharides, Center 
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T-M distribution capabilities of the public health system a chained and convergent techno-
economic network – comprising all the elements from S through to M – came into operation. 
Commercial exports to Brazil commenced in 1989, and the vaccine was used in immunization 
campaigns in eight states in that country. In epidemiological terms the results were mixed, 
probably due to the fact that the Brazilian epidemic was caused by several group B serotypes 
in addition to the one that was used to produce the vaccine (Noronha, et al. 1995). By this act 
the M sub-network extended itself from the national public health system to overseas markets. 
Feinsilver (1993) estimates that up to 1991 at least 30 million doses had been exported to Bra-
zil, at an average price in the area of US$ 5 – 7, and a total value of at least US$ 180 million. 
An agreement for transferring the production technology to Brazil was signed in 1992, but 
was later that year suspended because of the low efficacy of the vaccine in Brazil (Feinsilver 
1993). To date, the VA-MENGOC-BC® has been manufactured in a total of 55 million doses 
and exported to 15 countries (Sotolongo, et al. 2007). 
In 1999 the US Treasury Department granted SmithKline Beecham (later merged into Glax-
oSmithKline) an approval to enter an agreement with the Finlay Institute. The agreement cov-
ers testing, clinical trials and marketing of the VA-MENGOC-BC® vaccine, and entails a 
notable exemption from the otherwise extremely tight (and unlawful) US embargo legislation. 
However, although the agreement held the potential for up to US$ 20 million worth of reve-
nues for the Institute (SmithKline Beecham 1999; TEC 2004), little has materialized from this 
deal. 
The meningococcal vaccine and irreversibility 
There are two momentous events in this story. The first is the 1983 decision to initiate a 
domestic vaccine development project. That decision has a techno-economic evaluation com-
ponent in creating a new actor by relocating the National Reference Laboratory both physi-
cally and organizationally, and it also has a strategic evaluation component in identifying a 
new target product for the techno-economic network. As a strategic evaluation it deviated 
from the initial interest of targeting ‘modern’ health problems, but still served the overarching 
political goal of reducing both overall and child morbidity and mortality. 
The second event is the commercialization of the vaccine by exporting it to Brazil, starting in 
1989. A product that was intended exclusively as a solution to a serious domestic health prob-
lem turned out to have a commercial potential, and it is possible that this made the Cuban 
leadership aware of the fact that ‘traditional’ disease patterns might open windows of oppor-
tunity for generation of export revenues. 
The consequence of this composite strategic and techno-economic evaluation was that the 
Cuban biotech sector developed strong specific capabilities in vaccine development and man-
ufacturing (T) based on bacteria culture. In a few years – from 1983 to 1987 – the T sub-net-
work in this technology platform came into being, with development capabilities and indus-
trial scale manufacturing facilities complete with fermentation, purification, formulation, final 
processing, and filling equipment, as well as the human resources to operate it. The biotech 
sector as such also developed more general capabilities in vaccine development and clinical 
testing of vaccines, for instance by improving the epidemiological surveillance systems and 
drug regulatory institutions. Finally, the Cubans made their first experiences in establishing 
overseas marketing capabilities (T-M). 
This ordered set of heterogeneous resources now punctualized itself into a stabilized techno-
economic network that represented what Callon calls an irreversibility (Callon 1992). By the   17 
same token it also punctuated itself as a node into other actor-networks – i.e. the rest of the 
emerging Cuban biotech sector.  
In a strongly convergent and irreversibilized network, the actors are perfectly identifiable, and 
their behavior is known and predictable. (Callon 1992), p 97 
Once in place, this irreversibilized techno-economic network in the field of bacteria fermen-
tation based vaccine innovation represented a factor in subsequent strategic evaluations. Or, 
put slightly differently: these capabilities turned themselves into important premisses for later 
strategic evaluations. While this techno-economic network was originally created as a tool to 
solve a specific problem at hand – the meningococcal epidemic – the question of whether 
there were other problems at hand that could be solved by that tool now arose. 
Strategic evaluations and the morbidity transition 
We may assume that this techno-economic network lowered the threshold for targeting infec-
tious diseases in the strategic evaluations that were to follow. At any rate, subsequently the 
leptospirosis and typhoid fever vaccines were developed. Later on, it was also decided to 
develop the pentavalent DTP-HiB-hepB vaccine, and the DTP components of the old triple 
vaccine were all based on bacteria culture. The tetanus toxoid – the T component of the DTP 
– was also needed as the carrier protein in the HiB conjugate vaccine. More recently, the 
techno-economic  network  of  the  Finlay  Institute  will  use  bacteria  culture  technologies  to 
supply the polysaccharide antigens to a polyvalent pneumococcal conjugate vaccine to be 
developed  in  collaboration  with  the  newly  founded  Centre  for  Biomolecular  Chemistry 
(CQB).
34 
However,  it  is  not  only  establishment  of  the  irreversibilized  techno-economic  network  in 
bacteria culture that may explain the apparent paradox of targeting infectious diseases instead 
of the diseases that were emerging with the morbidity transition. Internationally, the technol-
ogical frontier in ‘vaccinology’ was advancing, opening new windows of opportunity. In 1981 
the plasma derived hepatitis B vaccine was licensed by Merck, and the recombinant hepatitis 
B vaccine came on the market in 1986 (Galambos and Sewell 1995). Recombinant protein 
production in single cell expression systems has later become the core technology platform 
for the CIGB, and the hepatitis B vaccine project, along with the interferon pilot project, seem 
to have been essential in creating those capabilities. 
Similarly, the conjugation technology that was introduced with the HiB vaccine in the USA in 
1988 could be used for other bacterial vaccines, like meningococci and pneumococci. Conju-
gating the polysaccharide to a ‘carrier’ protein induces lasting immunity in infants in contrast 
to  the  previous  ‘pure’  polysaccharide  vaccines.  Thus,  conjugate  vaccines  are  suitable  for 
childhood  immunization  programs,  and  not  only  immunization  campaigns  for  combating 
outbreaks or epidemics, like for instance the French meningococcal group A and C non-
conjugated polysaccharide vaccine that was used by the Cubans in 1979.  
World-wide, the 1990s and 2000s witnessed old polysaccharide vaccines against group A, C, 
Y, and W-135 meningococci being replaced by or complemented with corresponding conju-
gates. Similarly, Wyeth’s 7-valent pneumococcal conjugate vaccine was released in 2000, and 
its new 13-valent and GSK’s 10-valent vaccines are currently in the process of entering the 
market. The capabilities in bacterial polysaccharide chemistry now possessed by the CQB will 
be  an  indispensable  element  in  developing  a  Cuban  pneumococcal  conjugate  vaccine,  as 
mentioned above. Consequently, both the Cuban hepatitis B and the HiB vaccine develop-
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ment projects – apart from targeting endemic disease in the country – seem to have been stra-
tegic moves in order to acquire technology platforms that had been developed abroad.  
The above paragraphs illustrate the potential complexity of strategic evaluations. One does 
not just consider the public health problems and economic opportunities and challenges at 
hand, but also technological opportunities that may be exploited or appropriated by conti-
nuous or breakthrough actions directed at the existing techno-economic networks. Although 
the ‘modern’ morbidity pattern was seen as the main public health challenge, the combat 
against ‘traditional’ (childhood) infectious diseases was far from won, and there was still a 
potential of further reductions of the infant mortality rate. Moreover, the techno-economic 
networks that had developed in the course of the meningococcal epidemic were in a position 
to exploit novel technological platforms, like recombinant protein expression and chemical 
conjugation. We must also add the economic considerations that were identified in the other 
paper. 
The creation of the techno-economic networks of Cuban biotech 
We may now sum up the responses to the first four questions of this paper. According to 
Callon a techno-economic network is incomplete whenever one or several of the sub-networks 
(S, S-T, T, T-M, M [and M-S]) are almost absent or severely underdeveloped. If, on the other 
hand, the sub-networks are in place, the techno-economic network is chained. Based on these 
distinctions it is possible to identify two main types of interventions: breakthrough action is to 
create new sub-networks in a discontinuous way, primarily whenever an incomplete network 
is present. Similarly, a dispersed network calls for continuity actions that aim at stimulating, 
extending or strengthening existing (weak) relations between the different sub-networks.  
The strategic evaluation that resulted in the decision to create a Cuban biotech sector called 
for massive breakthrough interventions. The science sub-networks (S) existed, but were dis-
persed, and the techno-economic networks were incomplete bordering on non-existence when 
it  came  to  technological  sub-networks  (T)  that  could  convert  the  knowledge  from  S  into 
products that could be transferred to the markets (M). The national T-M sub-network already 
existed, represented by a national, universal, comprehensive and free public health system, 
while  the  international  markets  had  to  be  developed  by  continuity  actions  that  are  still 
ongoing. 
By applying the concept of the ‘complete cycle’ chained and convergent techno-economic 
networks based on selected technology platforms are integrated under one management, from 
S through to T-M. One organization, the ‘Pedro Kourí’ institute, constitutes M-S – a direct 
and separate link between the market (M) and science (S). However, although the organiza-
tional boundaries of the techno-economic networks are coinciding with the boundaries of the 
technological platforms, one of the vaccine products demonstrates that there is close collabo-
ration between several of the centers operating in the vaccine industry. 
Horizontal collaboration 
So far we have examined the M-S sub-network (at the Pedro Kourí Institute), the technologi-
cally specialized S, S-T, and T sub-networks of the complete cycle research and production 
centers, as well as the T sub-networks of the auxiliary centers. Let us now address the perfo-
rated lines separating the three core vaccine centers in Figure 1. To what extent do the centers 
collaborate in their research and development activities, and to what extent are their produc-
tion systems horizontally integrated?   19 
Collaborative R&D activities 
My sources repeatedly made reference to different collaborative research and development 
projects, in which typically several organizations in the Scientific Pole were involved. This is 
supported by Thorsteinsdóttir et al. (2006), who found that in 2000-2 more than 30 percent of 
internationally published Cuban papers in health biotechnology had authors from more than 
one domestic organization, a share that had tripled from 1991-3.
35 Thus, the perforated lines 
in Figure 1 may be empirically justified in terms of R&D collaboration. We now turn the atten-
tion  to  the  production  capabilities,  illustrated  by  the  case  of  the  complex  and  integrated 
production line of the pentavalent DTP-hepB-HiB vaccine. 
Integration of a production line in the vaccine industry 
The case of the pentavalent vaccine illustrates an integrated product line and development 
process involving four of the centers of the Cuban vaccine industry. This case will demon-
strate that although each complete cycle center may be said to constitute a techno-economic 
network in its own right, together they constitute a meta-network capable of manufacturing a 
vaccine containing components developed or produced by three of the different techno-eco-
nomic networks. 
The pentavalent vaccine contains antigens against five different childhood diseases: diphthe-
ria, tetanus, whooping cough (pertussis), hepatitis B and haemophilus B, commonly abbre-
viated as DTP-hepB-HiB. The purpose of such a combination is to reduce the number of 
injections needed to complete the immunization schedule of national immunization programs, 
thereby giving rise to savings in terms of both immunization costs and human suffering. Sev-
eral vaccine manufacturers already have this vaccine on the market, but the Cubans decided to 
develop and manufacture their own, both as an import substitution measure and as a foreign 
currency earner. Globally, pentavalent vaccines are used in national immunization programs 
in both developed and developing countries. 
The DTP components of the vaccine is manufactured by the Finlay Institute, and these are for 
most practical purposes identical to the old triple vaccine, which has been on the market for 
several decades. The diphtheria and tetanus antigens are modified toxins (toxoids) from the 
bacteria, and the pertussis antigen is the whole-cell inactivated bacterium. The production 
processes for these antigens are based on cultivation of the bacteria, and purification and 
modification of the antigenic substances. The history of CIGB’s recombinant hepatitis B vac-
cine and CQB’s synthetic HiB vaccine were accounted for above. 
In short, the pentavalent DTP-hepB-HiB vaccine is a combination of a traditional product (the 
DTP vaccine), a reverse engineered recombinant product (the hepB component), and a truly 
novel product based on chemical synthesis (the HiB component). The DTP antigens and the 
tetanus toxoid for the HiB component (the synthetic HiB polysaccharide is conjugated to the 
tetanus toxoid protein) are manufactured by the Finlay Institute, while the HiB polysaccharide 
and the hepatitis B antigens are manufactured at GIGB, which also carries out the conjugation 
of the HiB component. Final processing and filling is done at BioCEN. The Heberpenta® 
vaccine is marketed by Heber Biotec, CIGB’s sales and marketing department. The develop-
ment process involved constructing a modularized product by close collaboration across orga-
nizational boundaries. The production line also demands coordination across organizational 
boundaries. This is but one expression of the successful inter-organizational collaboration of 
the Cuban biotech sector. 
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The boundaries between the techno-economic networks of the three core organizations of the 
Cuban vaccine industry are porous both in the S sub-networks and the T sub-networks. The 
question  that  now  arises  is  how  independent  organizations  working  under  conditions  of 
extreme scarcity of resources are able to undertake collaborative action undisturbed by turf 
fights and project ownership struggles. The point of the ‘complete cycle’ is to place the com-
plete techno-economic network from S to T of each technology platform under one single 
management, but how is the interaction between personnel of the different biotech centers 
structured and coordinated? It also remains to explain the somewhat peculiar cash flow of the 
techno-economic networks, making the State Council the obligatory passage point (OPP) in 
Figure 1. 
In order to answer these questions we will observe two striking characteristics of the Cuban 
biotech sector: firstly, the centralized decision making structure and the close connection to 
the top national political leadership; and secondly, the formalized horizontal collaborative 
mechanism of the ‘Scientific Pole’. 
Management and coordination of the techno-economic networks 
This section aims at responding to the sixth question of this paper, namely how the techno-
economic networks of the Cuban biotech sector are managed and coordinated. First the rela-
tion between the State Council and the biotech sector will be described in terms of an obliga-
tory passage point. Then I describe how that relation, combined with a horizontal collabora-
tion mechanism called the Scientific Pole, have facilitated the kind of inter-organizational 
collaboration that was witnessed in the case of the pentavalent vaccine. 
As already stated, an important term for conceptualizing power in actor-network theory is the 
‘obligatory passage point’, which is understood as a node in the actor-network that other 
actors have to pass through in the pursuit of their respective interests (Latour 1987). In the 
Cuban biotech sector this node is occupied by the State Council, or rather the Pole Office of 
the State Council, so in this case the obligatory passage point coincides with the summit of a 
highly hierarchical and formal organizational structure. But in theory, a node in a non-hierar-
chical actor-network may also become an obligatory passage point. 
The State Council 
The State Council
36 is at the core of the political leadership in Cuba. Formally, the State 
Council functions as the working committee of the National Assembly in the five year terms 
between its sessions. It is headed by the President, in his capacity of Chief of the State,
37 
while simultaneously also holding the position of Chief of the Government. In 2008 Raúl 
Castro  succeeded  his  brother  Fidel  in  these  positions.  In  spite  of  its  formal  status  as  the 
executive branch of the National Assembly, in my view the State Council rather resembles a 
personal secretariat for the President. This is the body where major national strategic deci-
sions are prepared for and made.  
The State Council is headed by the President, Raúl Castro, and six vice-presidents, among 
them a former Minister of Health, several members of the Politburo of the Communist Party, 
several  heroes  from  the  insurrection  of  the  1950s,  an  army  General,  a  Vice-Minister  of 
Defense, and the secretary of executive committee of the Council of Ministers (Anon. 2008). 
Among the 25 members of the State Council one finds the Ministers of Health, of Foreign 
Affairs, and of Communications, the Director of CIGB, Luís Herrera, as well as the President 
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himself, the Vice-President and a secretary of the National Assembly. As stated above, in his 
dual role the President heads the State Council in his capacity of Chief of the State, and the 
Government with subordinated ministries as Chief of the Government.  
The secretary of the State Council is José Miyar Barrueco, who is also the Director of the 
office of the State Council that directs the biotech sector, the so-called Scientific Pole Office, 
or Pole Office. Most of the organizations belonging to the Scientific Pole are subordinated to 
different sectoral ministries, but the ten most important research and production centers of the 
biotech sector are managed directly by the Pole Office, among them CIGB, the Finlay Insti-
tute, and CIM.  
The State Council and the biotech sector 
This section explains how political, economic and administrative power is exercised by the 
State Council by way of its direct link to the biotech sector. The close and privileged affilia-
tion of the primary biotech centers with the State Council is an expression of the priority of 
health and biotechnology by the revolutionary government. The biotech centers were moved 
from the ministries to the State Council in the early 1990s in order to protect them from the 
austerity measures imposed on all other sectors by the declaration of the ‘Special Period in 
Times of Peace’,
38 which was precipitated by the collapse of the East Bloc economic CMEA 
collaboration.  
As has already been spelt out, the concept of the ‘closed cycle’ dictates that each biotech 
center is a separate legal and organizational entity, with a managing director and sub-directors 
for  the  different  divisions  of  the  organization.  The  managing  directors  of  the  centers  are 
responsible for initiation of R&D projects, for their execution, for developing the productive 
capabilities of the center, for managing human resources, for managing regulatory affairs (IP 
and drug regulations) and quality control, and for marketing and sales.  
Nevertheless, the Pole Office at the State Council has full control of the economy of the cen-
ters,  and  that  on  a  highly  detailed  level.  Even  international  travel  activities  of  individual 
employees have to be approved of on a case-by-case basis by the Pole Office (De la Fuente 
2001),
39 a fact that indicates that economic disbursements of hard currency of the order of 
magnitude of USD 1,000, and possibly less, are exempted from the personal discretion of the 
managing directors.  
The same applies to the income side, that is, the sales or joint venture contracts with overseas 
partners have to be approved of by the Pole Office. All exports revenues from the commer-
cializing branches of the biotech centers are collected by the State Council, and subsequently 
redistributed to the centers to cover operational costs and investments, and the surplus is 
redistributed to other sectors of the economy, like any other government foreign currency 
income. By ordering the techno-economic networks of Cuban biotech in this way the State 
Council becomes an obligatory passage point. 
This is but an indication of the level of detailed decision making being undertaken by the Pole 
Office. All research and development projects to be initiated that may incur foreign currency 
spending have to be approved of by the Pole Office, and of course the same goes for invest-
ment in production equipment. Sometimes even decisions about human resources allocation 
are taken by the Pole Office, which may happen whenever the unique competence of an 
employee in one center should be more needed in another. 
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Centralized and participatory decision making  
We may draw a few corollaries from this. The role of the managing directors of the biotech 
centers should be described in terms of being administrators, facilitators, and producers of 
knowledge to be used as input for the decisions of the Pole Office. The managers are respon-
sible for generating economic revenues, but do not control the cash flow. The decisions made 
by the Pole Office must be orderly executed according to the detailed budgets accompanying 
them. On the other hand, knowledge generated inside the centers have to be communicated to 
the Pole Office in order for it to make adequate strategic and tactical judgments.  
Consequently, the quality of the decisions made within this managerial model depends upon 
the degree to which information from lower levels of the organizations is relayed upwards 
through the bureaucratic hierarchy, which in turn depends on the degree to which individual 
scientists may express themselves. Obviously, freedom of expression is a relative phenome-
non. Former Director of R&D at CIGB José De la Fuente complained about increasing politi-
cal  ‘correctness’  replacing  academic  freedom,  and  removal  of  protection  from  ‘voluntary 
work’
40 (for instance in construction work or mosquito eradication campaigns) prior to his 
defection in 1999, and 
[…] a political crusade against scientists occupying prominent positions who defended ideas 
that diverged from the hard line dictated by the Party. (De la Fuente 2001), p 907 
Nevertheless, there is nothing to suggest that Cuban biotech is anywhere in the vicinity of 
evolving into Stalin-Soviet style ‘Lysenkoism’, i.e. the subordination of science to ideological 
principles, as described by Roll-Hansen (1989). My general impression from interviews and 
interaction with Cuban scientists is that the degree of freedom of expression of the Scientific 
Pole employees in matters relating to their work assignments and to the operation of the or-
ganization resembles that of employees in private or public business enterprises in any other 
country. That is, in technical and scientific matters people may speak relatively freely in dis-
cussions prior to making decisions, while discussion of more political issues is a task rather 
left to management. 
My sources support the view that there is close and frequent contact between the managing 
directors and the Pole Office executives. Together the latter and some of the managing direc-
tors comprise a ‘scientific-technological board’, which meets on an almost weekly basis.
41 
Perhaps this management model could be described in terms of centralized and participatory 
decision making.  
To sum up, the most important biotech centers are closely connected to the top political lea-
dership – a leadership highly dedicated to using health and science as both tools for develop-
ment and legitimization of its political power. The biotech sector thus enjoys high priority for 
investment and other resources. The administrative power of the biotech sector is strongly 
centralized, and the decision making on part of the Pole Office is on a highly detailed level.  
The  actor-networks  of  the  techno-economic  networks  have  been  ordered  so  that  the  Pole 
Office and the State Council occupy the position of an obligatory passage point. All the cir-
culating intermediaries – funds, research proposals, project progress reports, accounts, man-
aging directors – that are used in the decision making processes that are ordering the techno-
economic networks of the biotech sector have to pass through this node.  
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In Figure 1 this is illustrated by the monetary flows. The commercial branches of each of the 
techno-economic  networks  generate  export  revenues  in  overseas  markets,  and  instead  of 
returning these intermediaries back to the techno-economic network that produced the goods 
that were exchanged, the money is diverted away and transferred to the Pole Office. This is 
the immediate and material basis for the power of the Pole Office. It is probably also the 
rationale for establishing the commercializing branches of each techno-economic network as 
separate legal entities. Apart from that the Pole Office has the discretion of hiring and firing 
of managers and employees, and so on. 
However, it is evident that the Cubans have not regarded this centralized ordering as a suffi-
cient condition for facilitating efficient use of resources in order to exploit the full productive 
and innovative potential of the biotech sector. In order to promote collaboration across the 
boundaries of the technologically separated techno-economic networks, a formal organiza-
tional body has been created: the Scientific Pole. We have seen that collaboration across the 
boundaries of each of the techno-economic networks does take place, both in the S sub-net-
works and the T sub-networks. Is it reasonable to accept the hypothesis that an arena for hori-
zontal coordination is a sufficient condition for successful collaboration to take place? 
The Scientific Pole 
In the following paragraphs I discuss how successful and efficient horizontal collaboration 
between the biotech centers is made possible. I also discuss the collaborative culture and con-
sensus based decision making processes that my sources were emphasizing. 
Although the Cuban biotech sector is governed by detailed decision making on part of the 
State  Council,  there  are  also  horizontal,  integrative  measures  and  mechanisms.  The  most 
important is the Scientific Pole, made up of more than 60 organizations connected to the bio-
tech sector.  
The Scientific Pole of Western Havana
42 was created in 1991, and in 1997 it comprised 38 
units, including several research and production centers, a number of research institutions, 
two faculties of the University of Havana, a consultancy agency, the national drug regulatory 
agency CECMED, a hospital, the national blood bank, and more. By 2009 the number of 
participating organizations has increased to more than 60.
43 The Scientific Pole is a cross-
sectoral  umbrella  organization,  in  that  the  member  institutions  belong  to  eight  different 
ministries as well as the State Council. The responsibility of being the Coordinator seems to 
rotate among the Directors of the research centers, and the Scientific Pole does not have any 
separate  secretariat  or  office.  The  main  tasks  of  the  Scientific  Pole  is  coordination, 
cooperation and strategic planning (CITMA 1997). 
The Scientific Pole does have a spatial delimitation of some sorts, and as such it could be 
understood in terms of a science park or an industrial region (Reid-Henry 2008). To put it 
briefly, the most of the core biotech centers are located in the suburb Cubanacán, in the west-
ern part of the capital, hence the full name The Scientific Pole of Western Havana. Below I 
will limit myself to a discussion of the organizational aspects of the Scientific Pole. 
Firstly, what is the mandate for or purpose of the Scientific Pole? Says Agustín Lage, the 
Director of CIM: 
It is not an administrative organization, nor an arena for executive decisions or for making 
business agreements. It is rather a space for strategic discussion. […] The Pole is simply that the 
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managing directors of these institutions meet about once a month for discussions and exchange 
of information. Present at these meetings are also the Secretary of the Council of the State, and 
often the ministers of Health, Agriculture, Higher Education and so forth, depending on the 
agenda. Occasionally, also Fidel Castro attends a meeting.
 44 
My impression is that Lage is exaggerating the strategic role of the Scientific Pole. All other 
sources depicted it as a body for negotiating collaborative use of facilities and equipment, and 
coordination of joint research projects. One could say that while the Biological Front was a 
body for strategic and political planning, the Scientific Pole is rather a body for execution of 
common projects and coordination of tasks.
45   
Collaboration in practice 
The above case study of the integrated production line of the pentavalent vaccine is just one 
indication that successful horizontal collaboration is taking place. Several sources stressed 
that collaborative research projects were also common. A collaborative mentality was said to 
manifest itself in informal information sharing between individual researchers, in lending and 
borrowing of technical equipment, in joint research and development project, and in inte-
grated production lines. 
There is no reason to doubt that the Scientific Pole really is an important arena for inter-orga-
nizational coordination. Yet, it remains to explain why such collaboration is possible. Over 
time  the  individual  biotech  centers  have  become  increasingly  responsible  for  being  self-
financed,
46 and de la Fuente (2001) describes  
[…]  increasingly  fierce  competition  between  groups  for  resources  and  paternity  rights  over 
promising projects. (De la Fuente 2001), p 906  
How are controversies like these resolved? Reid-Henry (2008) has commented on workplace 
relations in Cuban biotech, and he interprets the motivation as a combined result of notions of 
social values and individual self-realization.  
My informants emphasized the consensual nature of the Scientific Pole meetings, and of the 
way  people  are  working  together  inside  and  between  the  organizations.  They  described 
workplace  relations  with  very  little  rivalry,  and  the  consensual  culture  was  commonly 
explained by reference to their common understanding of undertaking a social mission of 
outmost importance, namely to supply the public health with needed biopharmaceuticals, and 
thereby serving the entire nation as such, as well as the revolution. This dedication on part of 
the employees in the Cuban biotech sector was contrasted with the commercial incentives 
driving the employees in capitalist biotechnology, with destructive competition as the obvious 
and inevitable result. The job security enjoyed in Cuba was also sometimes mentioned as a 
contributing factor to collegiality and collaboration. 
There should be no reason to doubt the dedication, motivation, and morale of the biotech 
workers. The concept of consagración – painstaking and total dedication to work (Bravo 
1998) – is the prerogative for the workplace relations in the biotech sector, and implies long 
work  days  and  abstention  from  the  private  foreign  currency  earning  activities  that  cause 
widespread absenteeism in almost all other sectors of the Cuban economy. 
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Several  informants  also  stressed  the  ‘fluid’  and  informal  nature  of  the  decision  making 
processes. I was repeatedly advised against putting too much emphasis on formal positions 
and organizational structures, since people often would counsel and discuss with each other in 
relaxed disregard of organizational boundaries and hierarchical levels. Maybe Luís Herrera’s 
double assignment as Managing Director of CIGB and Member of the State Council – which 
manages the CIGB – is but one illustration of this fluidity. 
To a certain extent it is imaginable that in discussions while undertaking collaborative work 
appeals based on references to the higher social end of supplying the nation with pharma-
ceuticals may have an impact in resolving controversies. However, in my view it is question-
able to conclude that attitudes and values alone would be sufficient to achieve consensus in a 
forum representing tens of heterogeneous organizations and several thousand employees, in 
an  economic  environment  characterized  by  extreme  scarcity  of  resources.  Moreover, 
explaining the consensual collaboration by reference to the absence of commercial incentives 
is to a certain extent undermined by the fact that many of the biopharmaceuticals in Cuban 
biotech product portfolio are in fact strongly commercially motivated.  
I would rather propose, somewhat speculatively, that it is the centralized management of the 
State  Council  that  facilitates  horizontal  collaboration  between  the  Cuban  biotech  centers. 
Horizontal and relatively informal cooperation – organized mainly by the Scientific Pole of 
Western Havana – is possible because there exists a body – the Pole Office at the State Coun-
cil – that has both the competence and the administrative power to cut through and resolve 
any conflicts that may arise between the (directors of) the different biotech centers. Note the 
presence of even the Secretary of the State Council (where the Pole Office is located) at the 
Scientific Pole meetings. 
Given the level of detail of the decisions made by the Pole Office at the State Council, the 
workers in the biotech sector may assume that just about any controversy that may arise could 
potentially be subject to referral to that higher authority for ruling or advice. And to the extent 
that the rulings of the Pole Office are predictable, one should expect such predictions to have 
a structuring effect on the negotiations and horizontal decision making processes within the 
Scientific Pole. Even the more ’fluid’ collaborative processes could be facilitated the by cen-
tralized and detailed decision making capabilities of the State Council. 
Most writings about diverging interests in the actor-network theory literature describe the res-
olution of  controversies  in  terms  of  translation  of  interests, by  enrolling other  actors,  by 
working to make them shift their goals, by persuading them to make certain detours that nev-
ertheless helps them reach their goals by other means, and so on (Latour 1987). In the case of 
the Cuban biotech sector, however, the actor occupying the obligatory passage point simply 
has the power to shift the goals of the other actors, regardless of their interests, and to order 
the techno-economic networks in exactly the way it sees fit. 
It must be mentioned, however, that when confronted with this interpretation, Dr. Agustín 
Lage, Director of the CIM, rebutted it, stating that the decisions made at the State Council 
only concerned strategic, and not operational, issues.
47 On the other hand, as already stated, 
several of my other sources confirmed the detailed management mode of the State Council. 
Summary: management and coordination of techno-economic networks 
We may now sum up the somewhat long and elaborate response to the fifth question about the 
management and coordination of the Cuban biotech sector. The Pole Office at the State Coun-
cil functions as an obligatory passage point for the entire sector, by commanding all the 
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intermediaries like money, project proposals and managers to pass through it. Nevertheless, 
the close and frequent contact with the managers of the biotech centers and the relative free-
dom of speech inside the techno-economic networks justify the term centralized and partici-
patory decision making as descriptive of the way of exercising power in the Cuban biotech 
sector.  
In order to ensure full utilization of scientific and productive infrastructure, and in order to 
unleash the full innovative capacity of the techno-economic networks the horizontal collabor-
ative mechanism of the Scientific Pole was created. However, it may be speculated that – 
contrary to the claims put forward by my sources – it is not any specific ‘socialist’ collabora-
tive and consensual culture that facilitates the successful collaborative activities, but rather the 
existence of a centralized power – the Pole Office at the State Council – with the competence 
and discretion to resolve any controversies appearing in the horizontal interaction. 
Despite its porous internal borders and fluid decision making processes, in Figure 1 the Cuban 
biotech sector and vaccine industry appears as an isolated system. The rest of the economy is 
represented by the public health system and the State Council only. The next section explores 
whether this is a justifiable image, or if the biotech sector is part of a comprehensive, over-
arching national system for support and promotion of science, technology and innovation. 
Techno-economic networks and the national innovation system of Cuba 
This final section of the paper explores the seventh question: what are the relations between 
the  techno-economic  networks  of  the  Cuban  biotech  sector  and  the  general  domestic 
scientific, technological and productive systems in Cuba? The following paragraphs describe 
the  officially  implemented  System  for  Science  and  Technological  Innovation  (SCIT)
48  in 
Cuba, and analyze to what extent the Cuban biotech sector is integrated with the general 
national  institutional  framework  for  science  and  technology  governance.  It  will  be 
demonstrated that the biotech sector enjoys a highly privileged status in terms of funding and 
political  support  compared  to  other  sectors.  I  will  look  at  the  influence  of  the  officially 
implemented System for Science and Technological Innovation, the National Programs for 
Science and Technology, and the Ministry for Science, Technology and Environmental Issues 
on the biotech sector. 
Cuba has explicitly adopted the national innovation system as a governing concept in its 
technology policies – the System for Science and Technological Innovation of the Republic of 
Cuba (SCIT). The background for its implementation is a critique of lack of links between 
investigative and productive forces that was put forward in the early 1990s. Richard Nelson’s 
book about national innovation systems (Nelson 1993) was extensively studied in Cuba, and 
the  Ministry  for  Science,  Technology  and  Environmental  Issues  (CITMA)
49  came  into 
operation in 1994. The SCIT was formally established in 1994.
50 This system comprises 1) 
the Government with its ministries, and the agencies of CITMA, 2) research organizations, 3) 
integrative entities, like the scientific poles, the Academy of Sciences, the Union of Workers 
of Science, and so on, and 4) national, sectoral and territorial research programs (Brundenius 
and Monreal 2004). 
In 2000 there were in total 15 National Programs for Science and Technology, of which three 
were of direct importance to the biotech sector: ‘Agricultural biotechnology’, ‘Biotechnol-
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ogy’, and ‘Human and veterinary vaccines’ (Brundenius and Monreal 2004). The preceding 
year the 15 programs were supporting a total of 572 research projects, and 155 projects had 
been concluded (Faloh, et al. 2000). By 2004 17 programs were in operation, with a total 
portfolio of 786 active and 537 concluded projects (GEPROP 2004).  
Judged by the official documents, at first glance the Cuban research programs resemble those 
of any other country in the North: for instance the evaluation criteria for peer reviews of the 
project proposals include relevance, novelty, scientific quality, scientific merits, and so on 
(CITMA 1995). However, there is a certain emphasis on application, since socioeconomic 
impact is one of the criteria. 
Over the ten year period from 1995-2004 a total of 162 million peso have been distributed 
through these programs. Of these funds the three biotech related programs (Vaccines, Agri-
cultural Biotechnology and Biotechnological Products) have distributed a total of 33.5 million 
peso, and the Vaccines program 2.5 million. However, even when converted into man-years 
using the average scientists’ extremely modest monthly salary at that time of 440 peso per 
month (approximately USD 20), the biotech related programs would cover no more than 634 
man-years annually. And that is if all funds cover personnel costs only. In 1997 the Cuban 
biotech sector employed about 12,000 workers, of which 1,440 researchers (CITMA 1997). It 
is evident that the National Programs account for just a minority share of the total funding of 
the biotech sector. 
Judged by their relative financial contributions the National Programs seem to play a minor 
role in making priorities for the R&D activities in the biotech sector. Rather, it seems like the 
expert committees of the National Programs approve of the project proposals that meet the 
scientific criteria, and then it is up to the State Council to make the real priorities by allocating 
the real funding. If this is the case then it is possible that all the R&D projects in the R&D 
project portfolio of each research and production centre would be formally approved of by the 
National Programs, but only some of them would be truly prioritized by funding by the State 
Council. It is in particular foreign currency funding that would be granted by the State Coun-
cil. By and large Gustavo Sierra at the Finlay Institute confirmed this description.
51 The Na-
tional Programs also fulfills a scientific consultative role in the follow-up of ongoing R&D 
projects in the biotech centers.  
This may be contrasted with the role of research councils in many other countries, whose 
financial contributions to public research organizations also may appear to be small compared 
to the basic funding. However, the important difference is that while the funding from such 
research councils may have a strong indirect influence on the allocation of the basic funding, 
in the Cuban biotech sector it is the direct funding of the State Council that sets the true 
priorities. 
I would like to add that in some instances the expert committees will, theoretically, have a 
hard  time  while  exercising  even  their  relatively  limited  powers  of  rejecting  sub-standard 
research project proposals. Gustavo Sierra gave me a vivid account of how Fidel Castro one 
day in 1991 appeared at the recently inaugurated organization with a copy of a news cable 
reporting the first cases of a cholera outbreak in Peru, determined that Cuba should develop a 
cholera vaccine.
52 It is doubtful that any expert committee, anywhere in the world, would 
have the stomachs to turn down a project that was initiated by the president in person.
53 
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It is a bit ironic perhaps that the jewel in the crown of Cuban science and technology, the 
most innovative sector of the Cuban economy – the biotech sector – is not in reality an 
integrated  part  of  the  official  System  for  Science  and  Technological  Innovation,  but  a 
privileged sector run directly by the top national political leadership. Even the public health 
system,  by  Thorsteinsdóttir  et  al.  (2004)  claimed  to  play  a  major  role  in  Cuban  biotech 
innovation,  seems  to  be  limited  to  supplying  the  M-S  sub-network  with  epidemiological 
information, and to carrying out clinical trials and distributing biomedical products (T-M). 
Nevertheless, as demonstrated in the first Cuba-paper, the biotech sector has established itself 
as a major foreign currency earner, which is probably its main contribution to the Cuban 
society at large. 
An update on the management structure Cuban biotech sector  
The Cuban biotech sector has been described as a dynamic field, with constant revisions of 
strategic and techno-economic evaluations. Just a few weeks after completing the fieldwork in 
2009 the newspaper Granma featured a series of news reports announcing reorganization of 
the Government, of the State Council, and of the responsibility for the biotech sector.  
On 2 March 2009 it was announced that several ministers and members of the State Council 
had  been  reassigned,  and  two  ministers  had  resigned  (Anon.  2009a;  Anon.  2009b).  The 
announcements were accompanied by public letters from the two resigning State Council 
members  Carlos  Lage
54  and  Felipe  Pérez  Roque  declaring  their  acknowledgement  of  and 
responsibility for the errors that precipitated their personal decisions to resign (Lage 2009; 
Pérez  2009).  Also  Fidel  Castro  issued  a  statement  denouncing  the  allegedly  circulating 
‘popular  rumors’  that  the  hiring  and  firing  process  was  any  expression  of  ‘Raúl’s  men 
substituting those of Fidel’ (Castro 2009). 
Moreover, the Secretary of the State Council and Director of the Pole Office, José Miyar Bar-
rueco, was appointed Minister of Science, Technology, and Environmental Issues (CITMA), 
and the responsibility of the entire biotech industry was transferred from the State Council to 
that  Ministry  (Anon.  2009b).  It  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  dissertation  to  analyze  the 
implications  of  these  changes,  and  the  motivations  behind  them.  However,  it  may  be 
speculated that the transfer of responsibility of the biotech sector from the State Council to 
CITMA  reflects  that  the  national  economy  has  improved  sufficiently  to  start  treating  the 
sector  somewhat  less  preferentially  than  what  has  been  the  case  up  to  now.  Another 
interpretation  is  that  the  biotech  sector  has  now  matured  beyond  the  phase  of  receiving 
prioritized investment, and that its main purpose is rather to be a foreign currency revenue 
earner for the Cuban state. 
Concluding remarks 
The main objective of this paper was to study how the Cuban biotech sector and its integrated 
vaccine industry were established, and how they are managed and coordinated in their overall 
national context. By organizing the analysis around seven specific research questions it has 
become possible to draw the following conclusions. 
First, the Cuban biotech sector was founded on a well developed health system, a highly edu-
cated labor force, and a scientific base in biomedicine and related disciplines, like physics, 
chemistry, biology, mathematics, computation, and medical specialties. The intervention built 
on an existing S sub-network and a national T-M sub-network (the public health system). 
                                                 
54 Incidentally, the brother of the managing director of the CIM.   29 
Early techno-economic evaluations – apart from founding the Biological Front – resulted in 
decisions of creating the missing T components by breakthrough actions from 1981 onwards. 
Second, in 1980 Castro initiated a pilot research and development project, which was suc-
ceeded by a massive investment for establishing national biotechnological research and pro-
duction capabilities (T). Each biotech center represents a separate chained and convergent 
techno-economic network specialized on a specific technology platform.  
Third, the S-T and T-M sub-networks were interconnected by applying the concept of the 
complete cycle, whereby the S, S-T, T, and T-M sub-networks within designated technology 
platforms were co-located in separate organizations. These organizations are supported by 
functional centers like CENPALAB (input to T), BioCEN (end of pipeline of T), and the 
‘Pedro Kourí’ institute, which fulfills a role of connecting the public health system network to 
the science networks by a theoretically novel M-S sub-network. 
Fourth, there was a seeming paradox in developing extensive vaccine innovation capabilities, 
thereby targeting a ‘traditional’ morbidity pattern, when it was a ‘modern’ morbidity pattern 
that induced the Castro government to establish the biotech sector in the first place. This con-
tradiction is to a large degree explained by the irreversibility constituted by the vaccine inno-
vation capabilities that resulted from the meningococcal vaccine project. It also seems like 
strategic technology platform development projects aiming at appropriating modern technolo-
gies like recombinant protein expression and chemical conjugation of polysaccharide antigens 
represented similar irreversibilities by opening up windows of opportunity for further vaccine 
innovation activities. It turned out to be possible to identify several health problems that could 
be solved by the technological capabilities already at hand, and in a way that could be com-
mercially viable. 
This point demonstrates that it is not interests alone that determine the strategic evaluations. 
The capabilities of the evolving techno-economic networks, as well as the appearance of 
appropriable new technology platforms on the international scene, open up opportunities for 
developing new products that demand reconsideration of previous strategic evaluations. As 
Michel Callon emphasizes, strategic and techno-economic evaluations are done in a recursive 
and reiterative process. 
Fifth, both the pentavalent vaccine itself and my sources testify to the widespread horizontal 
collaboration that takes place between the Cuban biotech centers. This collaboration is most 
likely facilitated by the centralized and detailed decision making procedures that are imposed 
by the State Council. 
Sixth, the Castro government placed the State Council at an obligatory passage point in order 
to centralize the economic and administrative power of the actor-network of the Cuban bio-
tech sector. The entire cash flow is channeled through this body, and detailed budgets are 
imposed on the individual biotech centers. The Biological Front became a consultative body 
for the State Council, mainly on strategic and political issues. In order to facilitate horizontal 
collaboration the Scientific Pole was set up as an arena for tactical discussions and coordina-
tion of ongoing collaborative projects involving more than one organization.  
Seventh, in a twist of irony, despite the implementation of a national innovation system, in 
Cuba called the System for Science and Technological Innovation (SCIT), the most innova-
tive sector of the Cuban economy – the biotech sector – is managed and administered sepa-
rately from that system. For almost three decades the Cuban biotech sector has enjoyed a 
highly privileged position with respect to investments as well as attention from the top politi-
cal leadership. It is only after the field work for this dissertation was concluded, more specifi-  30 
cally in March 2009, that some reorganization in the Cuban government structure may be 
putting the sector on slightly more equal terms with the rest of the Cuban economy.  
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